Until
outlawed in mid 70s CIA directly involved in assassination
attempts against Castro of Cuba, and Congolese leader
Lumumba. CIA also encouraged plots that resulted in
assassination of Dominican Republic President Trujillo,
South Vietnamese president Ngo Dinh Diem in 63 and Chilean
Rene Schneider in 73. Most extensive assassination op was
Operation Phoenix conducted during latter part of VN war.
Twentieth Century Fund. (1992). The Need to Know: Covert
Action and American Democracy, 83.
Vietnam,
65-70 details re Vietnam. From 65-68 U.S. and Saigon intel
services maintained an active list of VC cadre marked for
assassination. Phoenix Program for 69 called for
"neutralizing" 1800 a month. About one third of VC targeted
for arrest had been summarily killed. Security committees
established in provincial interrogation centers to determine
fate of VC suspects, outside of judicial controls. Green
Berets and navy SEALs most common recruits for Phoenix
Program. Green Beret detachment B-57 provided admin cover
for other intel units. One was project cherry, tasked to
assassinate Cambodian officials suspected of collaborating
with NVNese, and kgb. Another was project oak targeted
against svnese suspected collaborators. They controlled by
special assistant for counterinsurgency and special
activities, which worked with CIA outside of general abrams
control. Stein. J. (1992), A Murder in Wartime,
360-1.
Vietnam,
66-73 Phoenix op from 1/68 thru 5/71, CORDS reported 20,857
VCI killed. Gvt of VN reported 40,994 from 8/68 thru mid 71.
Per cord statistics 12.4% Deaths could be attributed to
Phoenix ops. Kenneth osborn of program said Phoenix became a
depersonalized murder program. A dept of defense analyst
thayer, found that 616 suspected VCI targeted by Phoenix
from 1/70 thru 3/71 were killed by Phoenix forces. After war
NVNese foreign minister Nguyen Co Thach said CIA's
assassination program slaughtered far more than the 21,000
officially listed by the U.S. In some parts of south 95% of
communist cadre assassinated or compromised by Phoenix.
Manning, R., (ed), (1988), War in the Shadows: the
Vietnam Experience, 72.
Vietnam,
68-72 Under Phoenix "security committees" in provincial
"interrogation centers" would determine fate suspected NLF.
Counterspy spring/summer 78, 8.
Vietnam, 69
Under Phoenix in July 69 "Vietnam information notes," a
state dept publication said target for 69 elimination of
1,800 VCI per month. Frazier, H. (ed). (1978), Uncloaking
the CIA, 97.
Vietnam, 73
According to Defense Dept official 26,369 South Vietnamese
civilians killed under Phoenix while op under direct U.S.
control (Jan 68 thru Aug 72 ). By same source, another
33,358 detained without trial. Colby in 73 admitted 20,587
deaths thru end 71 , 28,978 captured, and 17,717 "rallied"
to Saigon gvt. Thus approx 30% targeted individuals killed.
All Phoenix stats fail to reflect U.S. Activity after
"official" U.S. Control of op abandoned. Counterspy
spring/summer 75 8.
Vietnam, 75
Counter-spy magazine describes Phoenix Program as "the most
indiscriminate and massive program of political murder since
the nazi death camps of world war two." Counterspy
spring/summer 75 6.
Vietnam, in
82 Ex-Phoenix operative reveals that sometimes orders were
given to kill U.S. military personnel who were considered
security risks. He suspects the orders came not from
"division", but from a higher authority such as the CIA or
the ONI. Covert Action Information Bulletin (now
Covert Action Quarterly) summer 82 52.
Vietnam.
Phoenix Program to neutralize VCI (tax collectors, supply
officers, political cadre, local military officials, etc).
Plan to send pru or police teams to get in practice, death
the frequent result of such ops, some times through
assassinations pure and simple. Powers, T. (1979), The
Man Who Kept the Secret, 181.
Vietnam.
Phoenix Program took over 20,000 lives, 65-72 U.S. Congress,Church
Committee Report. (1976) B 1 27.
Vietnam,
July 71 Colby inserted chart to Representative Reid showing
that some 67,282 persons had been neutralized by Phoenix ops
against VC between 68-71 Of these 31 percent had been
killed, 26% rallied, and 43% captured or sentenced. Frazier,
H. (ed). (1978). Uncloaking the CI, 18.
Vietnam,
67-73 The Phoenix Program used the CIA's assassination
squads, the former counter terror teams later called the
provincial reconnaissance units (PRU). Technically they did
not mark cadres for assassinations but in practice the pru's
anticipated resistance in disputed areas and shot first.
People taken prisoner were denounced in Saigon-held areas,
picked up at checkpoints or captured in combat and later
identified as VC. Sheehan, N. (1988), A Bright Shining
Lie, 732.
Vietnam,
Phoenix Program, late 60 early 70 took over 20,000 lives in
Vietnam. U.S. Congress,Church Committee Report.
(1976) B 1 27.
Vietnam.
Phung Hoang aka Phoenix Program quotas for units set by
komer for all 242 districts. One result indiscriminate
killing with every body labeled VCI. Powers, T. (1979),
The Man Who Kept the Secrets, 181-2.
Conflict,
li.
Law
professor at University of Washington, Seattle, Roy L.
Prosterman, designed the land reform program the U.S.
Government promoted in the Philippines, Vietnam, and El
Salvador. In each place the program was accompanied by a
rural terror. In Vietnam the Phoenix Program killed 40,000
civilian between August 68 and mid-71; in Philippines,
martial law; in El Salvador, a state of siege. Covert
Action Information Bulletin (now Covert Action
Quarterly) Winter 90 69
Consequences.
Vietnam,
67-70 Phoenix a fiasco, it unmanageable and encouraged
outrageous abuses. Valentine, D. (1990), The Phoenix
Program, 323.
Vietnam, 75
according to Frank Snepp's Decent Interval up to
thirty thousand special police, CIA and Phoenix related
Vietnamese employees were left behind. Saigon CIA station
managed to pull out only 537 of its 1900 Vietnamese
including close to 1000 high-level Vietnamese who had built
close relationships with the agency over the years.
Covert Action Information Bulletin (now Covert Action
Quarterly) 6-7/79 4.
Vietnam,
68-72 CI Phoenix project run jointly CIA and U.S. Army
military intel. Counterspy 5/73 21.
Vietnam, 75
U.S. military provided approx 600 case officers to
supplement 40-50 CIA case officers for Phoenix ops.
Counterspy spring/summer 75 8.
Vietnam.
The Phoenix and the identity card programs. Volkman, E., &
Baggett, B. (1989), Secret Intelligence, 150.
Vietnam,
65-69 CI/pacification efforts initiated by French culminate
in Phoenix Program designed to eliminate Viet Cong
infrastructure. Made official June 68, Phoenix was
intensification of ci ops and involved "mass imprisonment,
torture and assassination." For thorough Phoenix description
seeCountersp 5/73 20.
Vietnam,
66-73 Phoenix Program synthesis police and pm programs. CIA
managing census grievance, rd cadre, counterterror teams and
pics. Military intel working with mss, ARVN intel and
regional and popular forces. Aid managing chieu hoi and
public safety, including field police. Needed to bring
altogether under special police. Valentine, D. (1990),
The Phoenix Program, 99.
Vietnam, 66
beginning of Phoenix Program. Lv 218. Phoenix to increase
identification VC infrastructure and passing info to
military, police, and other elements who were to induce
defections, capture them, or attack them in their
strongholds. Colby, W. (1989). Lost Victory, 266.
Vietnam,
67-73 In 67 CIA proposed all U.S. Intel agencies pool info
on VC at district, province and Saigon levels for
exploitation. Program first called intel coor and
exploitation program (icex). Phoenix the name of program.
Assigned quotas for VC to be neutralized. To focus police
and intel orgs. Against communist apparatus. Blaufarb, D.S.
(1977), The Counterinsurgency Era, 243-8.
Vietnam,
67-73 District intel ops coor center (diooc). Dien ban
center a model for all of Phoenix. Bldg 10' x 40'. Manned by
two U.S. soldiers, 2 census grievance, one rd cadre, and one
special branch. Diooc intel clearinghouse to review,
collate, and disseminate info. Immediate local reaction.
Americans kept files of sources, VCI and order battle.
Reaction forces 100 police, 1 PRU unit, guides from census
grievance. Marines screened civilian detainees using
informants and diooc's blacklist. Valentine, D. (1990),
The Phoenix Program, 126.
Vietnam, 67
12/20/67 Prime Minister signed directive 89-th. T/vp/m
legalizing Phung Hoang, VN clone of Phoenix. Valentine, D.
(1990), The Phoenix Program, 148.
Vietnam, 67
Phoenix Program in fledgling stage conceived and implemented
by CIA. Valentine, D. (1990), The Phoenix Program,
147.
Vietnam, 68
Phoenix Program statistics were phony a bust and a fake.
DeForest, O., & Chanoff, D. (1990), Slow Burn, 54-55.
Vietnam, 69
Program of 69 campaign called for elimination of VCI.
Program became known as Phung Hoang or Phoenix. In each
province the chief established a province security committee
(PSC). PSC controlled the npff and sp who maintained
province interrogation centers (pics). Counterspy
5/73 20.
Vietnam, 71
CIA had no intention handling over attack on VCI to national
police command. CIA advisers to special police advised to
begin forming special intel force units (sifu). 8-Man teams
composed of 4 volunteers each from special police and field
police. Sifu targeted at high-level VCI, as substitutes for
pru. They sign CIA planned manage attack on VCI thru sb,
while keeping Phoenix intact as a way of deflecting
attention. Valentine, D. (1990), The Phoenix Program,
391.
Vietnam, 71
In revising Phoenix Program (because of all communist
penetrations in gvt) first steps to hire southeast asia
computer associates (managed by a CIA officer) to advise
200-odd VNese techs to take over MACV and CORDS computers.
VNese were folded into big mack and Phung Hoang management
info system (phmis). Valentine, D. (1990). The Phoenix
Program, 363.
Vietnam, 72
In report on Phoenix effectiveness in 9/72 Phung Hoang
crossed out and anti-terrorist inserted. The end of Phoenix?
Some Phoenix ops in 73. Valentine, D. (1990). The Phoenix
Program 403, 406.
Vietnam, 75
U.S. Still involved in Phoenix in 75. Program renamed
special police investigative service (spis). U.S. provides
data processing facilities for spis thru, Computer Science
Services, inc. Which runs intel thru machines to classify
and collate them and then turns info over to spis.
Valentine, D. (1990). The Phoenix Program, 415.
Vietnam.
Phoenix Program, resources control program, checkpoints,
identification card program, paramilitary police called the
police field force a 100 man mobile company at least one
assigned to each province. Aid helped upgrade police and
developed national police academy, improved communications
and files, established one two-way radio in every village.
Chieu hoi program. Refugee generation programs. Province
coordinating committees supervised civic action on bridges,
roads, public buildings, agricultural extension work,
medical technicians and more. Blaufarb, D.S. (1977). The
Counterinsurgency Era, 217-8.
Vietnam,
67-73 The Phoenix Program used the CIA's
assassination squads, the former counter terror teams later
called the provincial reconnaissance units (PRU).
Technically they did not mark cadres for assassinations but
in practice the PRU's anticipated resistance in disputed
areas and shot first. People taken prisoner were denounced
in Saigon-held areas, picked up at checkpoints or captured
in combat and later identified as VC. Sheehan, N. (1988),
A Bright Shining Lie, 732.
Vietnam,
Phoenix. Ranelagh, J. (1986), The Agency 437-441.
Vietnam,
police. Public safety included Michigan State University
program. Resources control, effort to regulate movement
resources both human and material. Includes set up
checkpoints roads and waterways, mobile checkpoints.
Resulted in 560,000 arrests by 1969. National identity
registration program. Every VNese 15 or older must register
and carry identification card. Fingerprints obtained. Once
completed program to include fingerprints, photos and bio
data. Surveillance of suspects role of special police
branch. Sp agents penetrate subversive organizations and use
intel collection, political data and files from census data
to separate good from bad. Pacification or Phoenix Program.
Systematic effort at intel collection and exploitation. All
intel services and America's CIA and military intel orgs.
Pool data from informers and prisoners. With this info
police and provincial reconnaissance units make raids in
contested areas to seize or eliminate VCI agents. See Klare,
M.T. (1972), War Without End, 265 for more death
squads.
Vietnam,
66-71 Phoenix op designed to help U.S. Military reach
crossover point, where dead and wounded exceeded VC's
ability to field replacements. In 4/67 Pres Johnson
announced formation of civil ops and revolutionary
development support (CORDS) for pacification. R. Komer as
deputy commander of MACV-CORDS. CORDS budget about $4
billion from 68-71. CORDS the management structure for
pacification programs. Personnel both military and civilian.
By 71, 3000 servicemen, advisers to ARVN, placed under
CORDS. 1200 Civilians by 71. Usaid responsible for material
aid. State and USIA also provided personnel. But CIA played
the crucial role. CORDS reinstated civic action teams under
name revolutionary development cadre. Rd program formed
teams of 59 SVNese, divided into 3 11-man security squads
and 25 civic action cadres. Teams to spend 6 months in a
village to fulfill "eleven criteria and 98 works for
pacification." 1. Annihilation of ...Cadre; 2. Annihilation
of wicked village dignitaries; etc. System placed 40,000
two-way radios in villages. Land reform failed. (Photos of
Phoenix propaganda material). Teams helped create regional
and popular forces (rf/pfs). Ruff-puffs, suffered high
casualties. They represented half of SVN gvt forces, they
had 55-66% of casualties. They inflicted 30% of communist
casualties. Underground pm effort called Phoenix which
included a "census grievance," stay-behind. He actually a
spy. All info fed into intel coordination and exploitation
program. VNese at Komer's request set up staff that with CIA
was responsible for coordinating intel reports on VC
infrastructure. Info from census grievance, military, police
reports. PM units - including CIA's provincial
reconnaissance units and ruff-puffs. Arrestees - those not
killed when captured - taken to provincial interrogation
centers (pic). Also regional prisons and a national center
all financed by CIA. Problems of coordination and jealousy.
Numerical quotas created saying how many VCI to be
eliminated each month. Torture used in questioning. Manning,
R., (ed), (1988), War in the Shadows: the Vietnam
Experience, 55-65.
Vietnam, 71
William E. Colby on july 19, 1971, before Senate
subcommittee testified CIA op Phoenix had killed 21,587
Vietnamese citizens between 1/68 and 5/71. In response to a
question from mr. Reid "do you state categorically that
Phoenix has never perpetrated the premeditated killing of a
civilian in a non-combat situation?" Colby replied: "No, I
could not say that...I certainly would not say never."
Counterspy 12/78 6.
Vietnam, 67
First MACV alloted Phoenix 126 officers and ncos. By end 67
one nco assigned to each of 103 dioccs then in existence.
All military officers and enlisted men assigned to Phoenix
Program took orders from CIA. Valentine, D. (1990). The
Phoenix Program, 145.
Vietnam,
68-73 Phoenix ci/terror op funded and covered by U.S. Aid,
CORDS pacification survey, public employment projects, and
other benign agencies. Counterspy may 73 22.
Vietnam, 71
1.7 Billion dollars go to CORDS in Phoenix Project. Colby
refuses congressional audit Phoenix funds before committee.
Counterspy 5/73 24.
Vietnam, 71
When questioned concerning unaccounted-for 1.7 Billion
dollars which had financed much of covert aspect of Phoenix
Program, Ambassador Colby assured house subcommittee on
foreign ops and govt info, all main problems has been
resolved and Congress could rest assured aberrations of
brutality would remain at a minimum. He did not know how
many innocent victims the program had killed, maybe 5,000,
maybe more. He did not have authority to discuss reasons why
Congress could not audit 1.7 billions worth of taxpayers
funds which went to CORDS. Counterspy 5/73 24.
Vietnam, 69
Colby rendered due process obsolete. VCI target broken into
three classes a, for leaders and party members; b, for
holders of responsible jobs; c, for rank-and file. Decision
c category to be ignored since Phoenix directed at VCI
command and control structure. Hamlet Evaluation System
(HES) explained. Hes guesstimate of VCI in 1/69 was 75,000.
Valentine, D. (1990). The Phoenix Program, 260.
Vietnam, 71
House subcommittee on foreign operations and gvt. Info.
investigates Phoenix. Colby insists project "respectable",
brutality minimized. Estimates 5000 killed. Congress denied
audit of Phoenix funds. Counterspy may 73 24.
Vietnam,
67-73 CIA developed Phoenix Program in 67 to neutralize:
kill, capture or make defect VCI. VCI means civilians
suspected of supporting communists. Targeted civilians not
soldiers. Phoenix also called Phung Hoang by VNese. Due
process totally nonexistent. SVNese who appeared on black
lists could be tortured, detained for 2 years without trial
or killed. Valentine, D. (1990). The Phoenix Program,
13.
Vietnam, 68
Phoenix ci/terror program established by Thieu's
presidential decree, literally written by CIA man William
Colby. Decree and future authorizations indicated that
suspects could be arrested without a warrant or copy of
charges and detained on basis of police dossier heresay
evidence. Once arrested, suspect could not confront accusers
or see dossier, was denied bail legal counsel, and was
denied a trial or even a hearing. At best one's case was
reviewed by province security committee composed of milt and
intel officers. Under Phoenix all rights of due process
stripped. Counterspy Winter 78 28.
Covert Action
Information Bulletin 13:3,
16-17:6-10; 17:48-49; 22:2,4,6,10-24; "from Phoenix
associates to civilian-military assistance," 22:18-19; "from
the hessians to the contras: mercenaries in the service of
imperialism," 22:10-11.
89 An
article by Rob Rosenbaum from interviews with General Secord
and Ted "Blond Ghost" Shackley. They give their answers to
questions about Iran-Contra, secret war in Laos, Phoenix
Program in Vietnam, CIA-Mafia plots of the sixties. Shackley
discusses charges of opium smuggling in Laos by elements
supported by CIA. Photos of Secord and Shackley. Shackley
interview in his risk-assessment consulting firm,
Rosslyn-based Research Associates International. Vanity
fair, 1/90 72-77, 126-8,130-1 Vietnam 68-73 Evan Parker,
Jr., John Mason, and John Tilton all from CIA were men who
headed Phoenix Program when it supposedly transferred to
military and CORDS. Roger McCarthy said CIA very much
involved with Phoenix. Corn, D. (1994), Blond Ghost: Ted
Shackley and the CIA's Crusades, 193.
Vietnam.
John Murray, of WHD, and his wife Delores, former CIA ops
officer, sending letters of disclosures re Shackley. He
covertly contacted William Miller, staff director of Church
Committee, and told how Shackley and Helms in 70 arranged to
keep CIA from being implicated in My Lai massacres. (Some
evidence suggested massacre related to CIA's Phoenix
Program.) Corn, D. (1994), Blond Ghost: Ted Shackley and
the CIA's Crusades, 302.
Vietnam, 67
50 officers and enlisted men invited to join counter
insurgency program. Those who accepted by CIA joined as
junior officer trainees. Most assigned to provinces as rdc/p
or rdc/o advisers and many as Phoenix coordinators.
Valentine, D. (1990). The Phoenix Program, 198.
Vietnam,
68-69 Robert K. Brown (later editor of Soldier of Fortune
magazine) worked with James K. Damron, CIA's project
coordinator for the Phoenix Program in Gia Dinh province.
Pigeon, R. (1986). The Soldier of Fortune, 44.
Vietnam,
Orrin DeForest, with U.S. Air Force special investigations
early on. Joined CIA in 68 as chief interrogator Hau Nghia
province in bien hoa under cover of Office of Special
Assistance (OSA). Duties included inspection of pics,
training VNese in interrogation. Monitoring intel
production. He discovered pics poorly run, Phoenix Program
slipshod, and CIA had been unable generate single agent.
Using methods learned while working with Japanese national
police in identifying, communist agents, disregarding CIA
methods, DeForest's efforts produced 80% hard intel in VN.
Minnick, W. (1992). Spies and Provacateurs, 50-1.
training,
55 Eisenhower establishes public safety program whose goal
is to train foreign police units in, among other things,
counterinsurgency. 62 Program becomes Office of Public
Safety which eventually procures 400 officers in 45
countries and yearly budget 50 million. Much of Phoenix
funding and training was thru Office of Public Safety. By 75
ops had distributed 200 million in equipment foreign police,
trained 7000+ senior police officials, and trained over 1
million rank and file police officers worldwide.
Counterspy Winter 78 29-30.
Vietnam, 75
Counter-spy magazine describes Phoenix Program as "the most
indiscriminate and massive program of political murder since
the nazi death camps of world war two." Counterspy
Spring/Summer 75 6.
Vietnam.
Former Phoenix advisor Wayne Cooper said "Operation Phoenix
was a unilateral American program", and Klare confirmed by
saying "although most of the dirty work was performed by
indigenous operatives, Phoenix was designed, organized,
financed, and administered by U.S. authorities."
Counterspy Winter 78 27.
Vietnam.
"Phoenix demonstrated that the U.S. Government through the
CIA will create, impose, and conduct an operation in another
country without a semblance of a mandate from a given people
or their representatives as long as the operation is
considered in interest of U.S. governmental objectives."
Counterspy Winter 78 27-8.
Vietnam,
59-69 the SEALs and the Phoenix Program. The Intel
Coordination and Exploitation Program (ICEX) was a joint
MACV/CIA op - forerunner of Phoenix. SEALs helped train
VNese personnel. SEALs assigned ops detachments. SEALs
worked with PRUs. By 68, with prisoner snatches, ambushes,
and increasing VC defections, ICEX program neutralizing 800
VCI every month. Phoenix began 7/1/68. Description of the
province intel ops coordinating center (piocc) and the
district (diocc). Combatting VCI in urban areas
responsibility of national police force and police field
force. SEALs taught PRUsin mekong delta. Description of
prus. They the most effective native troops. By end of 68,
the iv corps PRUswere almost entirely advised by seal
personnel. Seal advisors accompanied PRUson average of 15
missions a month. Description of ops. Dockery, K. (1991).
SEALs in Action, 167-176.
Vietnam,
68-73 ttwo small groups wreaked havoc on the VCI. The
Provincial Reconnaissance Units (PRU) and the Navy's SEALs.
PRUs and SEALs often worked together and both killed many
VCI and guerrillas -- the enemy had wrapped itself in the
population. Together they were fewer than 6000 men. They had
access to the best intel often coming directly from CIA. Pru
had roots in the counterterror teams of the early 60s. In 66
the ct became prus. Details of the makeup and recruiting
source of the prus. PRUsoften killed targets. Military
participation in the pru program was to end in 10/70. Pru
was the most effective action arm of the Phoenix Program.
Details of the SEALs larger-than-life reputation earned in
VN. Andrade, D. (1990), Ashes to Ashes, 171-199.
Vietnam,
65-72 During Nixon's first 2 1/2 years, state department
officially admits that the CIA-run Phoenix Program murdered
or abducted 35,708 VNese civilians, 4,836 more than the
pentagon claimed the NLF had assassinated or kidnapped
during the same period, and a monthly increase over the 200
killed by the CIA every month under johnson. Senator Gravel
edition, (1971), Pentagon Papers v 300.
Vietnam,
65-73 Phoenix Program torture tactics include rape, electric
shock, water torture, hanging from ceiling, beatings,
incarceration and execution. Counterspy 5/73 16.
Vietnam, 69-71 K. Barton Osborn, Phoenix agent, testified to
Congress "I never knew an individual to be detained as a VC
suspect who ever lived through an interrogation in a year
and a half. Uc 114. Note says this testimony given before
U.S. Congress,Heari. 315-321.
Vietnam, 73
"The prime difference between the types of intelligence
provided to the military units and the Phoenix coordinator
was that all information going to Phoenix was of a political
nature ... I was following through on a reported (VC)
suspect that one of my agents had identified. The man was
interrogated at the marine counter-intelligence complex and
I was invited to witness it. As I entered the hooch the man
was being taken out, dead. He died from a six inch dowel
pushed through his ear and into his brain." Barton Osborn,
former Phoenix case officer before Armed Services Committee,
1973. Counterspy Spring/Summer 75 7.
Vietnam.
Colby supervised est of pics in each of SVN's 44 provinces.
Each center constructed with CIA funds. Agency personnel
directed each centers op much of which consisted of torture
carried out by VN nationals. Coi 207. Colby admitted serious
abuses committed under Phoenix. Former intel officers came
before Congressional cmttees to describe repeated examples
torture. Marchetti, V., & Marks, J.D. (1974), The CIA and
the Cult of Intelligence, 207 see fn.
Vietnam,
66-74 CIA analyst, Nelson H. Brickman, on 11/66 produced
basic guidelines for [the Phoenix Program] in a memorandum
that described the VCI and suggested which parts of it
should be targeted. His memo said rank-and-file members were
not legitimate targets "because they were most often
unwilling participants in the revolution." Brickman called
for using all available intelligence services to neutralize
the VCI. Robert Komer was so impressed he assigned Brickman
to the revolutionary development office. He adopted
brickman's suggestion that there was no need to begin a new
anti-vci program, only that the existing programs be brought
together and managed by a single bureau. He recommended the
U.S. Agencies get their houses in order before bringing in
the gvn. Brickman "deserved the credit" for the Phoenix
Program. A program called intel coordination and
exploitation (icex) was the first structure. Evan parker
named director of icex but komer had full control. U.S.
Military reluctantly participated initially. Icex officially
created on 7/9/67, although basic structure had been in
place a year. Building of district ops and coordinating
centers (doicc) which by late 67 were called district intel
and ops coordinating centers (dioccs). MACV directive 381-41
stated: "to coordinate and give impetus to U.S. and gvn
operations...Directed toward elimination of the VC
infrastructure." Icex placed under cords. South Vietnamese
were unwilling to take program seriously. Andrade, D.
(1990), Ashes to Ashes, 58-70.
Vietnam,
67-72 K. Barton Osborn's testimony re the Phoenix Program
before the house committee on government ops, 8/71. Osborn
characterized program as a "sterile, depersonalized murder
program." Andrade, D. (1990), Ashes to Ashes, xv-xvi.
Vietnam, 67
The Phoenix (Phung Hoang) program was officially born on
12/20/67 when the SVNese premier issued a decree. This
differed from ICEX only in official SVNese support for the
program. Seal-and-search op in Bui Cui village. LRRP ambush
parties. People's self-defense forces (psdf) started after
Tet, it was a nationwide system of local militias. Andrade,
D. (1990), Ashes to Ashes, 72-81.
Vietnam,
68-70 PIOCCC had extensive dossiers on VCI and the chieu hoi
program was the largest producer of Phoenix intel. 132. A
criticism of Phoenix was the covert control by CIA. Despite
influx of military advisers, CIA controlled chain of command
and purse strings. Colby, top man of CORDS in 69 had been
with CIA. American directors of Phoenix at national level
were all CIA. In 7/69 the system changed. "Management and
support facilities for Phoenix were officially transferred
from the office of the special assistant to the ambassador
(osa) (cia) to MACV, who assumed full responsibility for
providing for or arranging monetary and logistical support
through American channels." From July 69 on, CIA made up
only a small part of the program. Details of numbers
neutralized and differences between CIA and military
estimates. The use of diocc VCI target folders, a simple
prepared set of biographical, operational, and
administrative questions. By the end of 1970 one hundred
thousand copies had been distributed. A sophisticated
computerized collation program called the Phung Hoang
Management Info System (PHMIS) was implemented. The program
combined the national police tracking system with VCI info
to gear up police for handling both. PHMIS was manned by
Vietnamese, using American advisers as trainers. 135-6.
Andrade, D. (1990), Ashes to Ashes, 134.
Vietnam, 68
President Thieu with the help of William Colby, Komer's
deputy for CORDS, drafted a decree that officially
sanctioned Phoenix/Phung Hoang on 7/1/68. Article 3 was of
paramount importance -- it defined who was or was not a
member of the VCI. Article 3 -- definitions: the Viet Cong
infrastructure is all Viet cong, political and
administrative organizations established by the communist
party which goes under the name people's revolutionary
party, from the cities to the countryside. The Central
Office of South Vietnam (COSVN) is the highest level
steering organization...And the front for the liberation of
South Vietnam (NLFSVN)....Viet Cong military units, members
of mass organizations established by the Viet Cong, citizens
forced to perform as laborers, or civilians in areas
temporarily controlled by the Viet cong, are not classified
as belonging to the Viet Cong infrastructure. Definition
adjusted over time. Andrade, D. (1990), Ashes to Ashes,
84.
Vietnam, 94
VN rejects visit of ex-CIA chief Colby, now a Washington
lawyer, who had planned to visit as a director of a
U.S.-based investment fund. Fund directors had planned to
hold a reception Monday. Event canceled, and directors will
meet in Bangkok. Colby was CIA's chief in Saigon during war
and was associated with Phoenix, an op to root out rural
support for communist guerrillas via sweeping arrests,
torture and execution of suspects. Critics said most of
those killed were innocent peasants. Chicago Tribune
12/3/94 21.
Vietnam,
accelerated pacification campaign, July 68 Thieu with
Colby's help issued decree est Phoenix committees at
national, regional and provincial and even district level,
"to which all the agencies involved had to furnish
representation." Colby, W. (1978). Honorable Men,
267.
Vietnam,
Australia, Vietnam, 62-73 Australian AATTV teams operated in
VN often in CIA Phoenix op. `Black team' commanded by
American of australian usually given target figure. He
pinpointed and black team would go out, usually dressed in
enemy's gear and the assassination then blamed on VC.
Toohey, B., & Pinwill, W. (1990), Oyster: The Story of
the Australian Secret Intelligence Service 87-88.
Vietnam,
icex intel coor and exploitation MACV/cia program to work on
VCI with Vietnamese cooperation. Colby helped devise program
which became Phoenix. Colby, W. (1978), Honorable Men
267.
Vietnam,
National Security study memo, 67-69 said although Phoenix
launched in Dec 67, Vietnamese cooperation minimal and only
after American prodding, Thieu issued a decree in July 68
directing network to be set up. Program forced on VNese. Pru
supervised, controlled and financed by Americans. Frazier,
H. (ed). (1978), Uncloaking the CIA, 111-125.
Vietnam,
Phoenix Program most notorious of counterinsurgency
programs. Originated by robert w. Komer, who now headed
Civilian Operations Revolutionary Development Staff (CORDS),
Phoenix designed to root out secret Vietcong infrastructure
in South Vietnam. Miller, N. (1989). Spying for America379.
Vietnam,
Phoenix, 68-70 In 69 CIA apparently had attack squeamishness
and pulled out of CORDS. Concluded Phoenix inappropriate. It
believed North had moved away from military engagement to
lacing entire gvt with spies -- possibly as many as 30,000
so Thieu's gvt could be easily overthrown. Baritz, L.
(1985). Backfire, 269.
Vietnam,
Phoenix op. Every person who ran program from Saigon
assigned to program from CIA. Colby and 20,000 + figure of
persons killed under Phoenix, see fn ag 440. Phoenix General
Ranelagh, J. (1986), The Agency 436-441.
Vietnam,
Phoenix Program, beginning circa 66-67 CORDS pacification
program. Komer settled on massive intel program on VC who
could be neutralized by SVN forces. First called ICEX. Name
changed to Phoenix in 69 with SVN version phung hoang. Had
interrogation centers in each of SVNs 235 districts and 44
provinces, card files and computerized indexes. Pru's of 50
to 100 men. In Phoenix CIA provided weapons, paid for Saigon
computer files, funded and trained PRU's and passed intel to
Phoenix. Colby told senate Phoenix killed 20,587 VCI. When
questions arose re legality Colby retreated and said 87%
killed in regular military actions. Two army lts. Told
federal judge they order to maintain kill quota 50 VCI a
month. Prados, J. (1986), Presidents' Secret Wars,
307-310.
Vietnam,
Phoenix Program evaluation. Robert Komer wrote Phung Hoang
has been a small, poorly managed, and largely ineffective
effort. Clearly Phoenix failed to eliminate the
infrastructure that remained after heavy losses of tet. Ce
274-8. Colby continued to see Phoenix as contributing
usefully to attack on VC. Blaufarb, D.S. (1977), The
Counterinsurgency Era, notes 328.
Vietnam,
Phoenix Program, july 69 "Vietnam information notes" a State
Dept publication says: target for 1969 calls for elimination
of 1,800 VCI per month. Frazier, H. (ed). (1978).
Uncloaking the CIA, 97.
Vietnam,
Phoenix Program. Part of total pacification program of gvt
VN. Colby testified that in over two and a half years there
were 29,000 captured, 17,000 defected and 20,500 killed, of
which 87% were killed by regular and paramilitary forces and
12% by police and similar elements. Vast majority killed in
military combat, fire fights, or ambushes, and most of
remainder were killed in police actions attempting to
capture them. Major stress to encourage capture. Borosage,
R.L., & Marks, J. (eds.). (1976), The CIA File, 190.
Vietnam,
Phoenix Program. Quotas and indiscriminate killing of
people. CIA conceived and organized program and regional and
provincial officers in charge were all CIA. Colby actually
wrote Phoenix directive which Thieu was finally pressured
into adopting july 68 Colby conceded Phoenix recorded deaths
of 20,587. Powers, T. (1979). The Man Who Kept the
Secrets, 181-2.
Vietnam,
Phoenix Program, 67-75 Targets members VCI. 637 Military
intel advisers assigned to Phoenix. Much money given to
VNese police to expand detention facilities. Phoenix org:
first the district co - ordination center, diocc, that
maintained dossiers on suspected VC. Once enough evidence
person placed on police green list. Suspect then jailed
without right to civilian trail. In cordon and search ops
all villagers lined up and walk past police checkpoint. Next
level province interrogation center, pic, staffed by SVNese,
Americans and CIA. After interrogation, suspect passed on to
province security committee, comprised of police chiefs,
military and police intel and advisors. Finally suspects
could be imprisoned under law for 2 years. This one way to
neutralize. Other way via Provincial Reconnaissance Units,
PRUs, who would kidnap or assassinate agents targeted by
diocc. Had American advisors from SEALs, Green Berets.
Official amnesty program called chieu hoi used to convince
VC to surrender. VC categorized as a,b, or c. A were key
members, c least impt. National police detention center
processed 180,000 a year. American money and effort went
into national identification card, id, project. All
Vietnamese over age 15 jailed if did not carry a card a RAND
computer tracked the 15 million suspects also cross-linked
to 10 million dossiers and fingerprints. The Dossier
issue 6, 11/83 14-5.
Vietnam,
Phoenix, 72-73 The F-6 program was a defensive measure to
bolster Phung Hoang after the Easter Offensive. F-6 sought
to increase pressure on the VCI by allowing province chiefs
to move against suspected cadre on the strength of a single
report rather then the usual three. With the culmination of
the F-6 program in early 73, the Phoenix Program came to an
end. In the spring of 72 phung hoang was absorbed into the
national police. The last American advisers left VN in
december 72. Various tables, command structure charts in
appendix. Andrade, D. (1990), Ashes to Ashes,
231-251.
Vietnam,
66-73 Phoenix Program synthesis police and pm programs. CIA
man managing census grievance, rd cadre, counterterror teams
and pics. Military intel working with mss, arvn intel and
regional and popular forces. Aid managing chieu hoi and
public safety, including field police. Needed to bring
altogether under special police. Valentine, D. (1990).
The Phoenix Program, 99.
Vietnam,
67-73 CIA developed Phoenix Program in 67 to neutralize:
kill, capture or make defect VCI. VCI means civilians
suspected of supporting communists. Targeted civilians not
soldiers. Phoenix also called phung hoang by VNese. Due
process totally nonexistent. SVNese who appeared on black
lists could be tortured, detained for 2 years without trial
or killed. Valentine, D. (1990). The Phoenix Program,
13.
Vietnam,
68-72 NLF according to Nixon adm decimated during Tet
Offensive, remainder by Phoenix Program. Nvese officer
reported Phoenix resulted in loss of thousands of our
cadres. Proof in 2 remaining offensives. In 72 and in 75
they did not rely on guerrillas. Baritz, L. (1985),
Backfire, 273.
Vietnam, 68
Phoenix Program quota of 1800 neutralizations per month.
Viet Cong Infrastructure system (vciis) fed 3000 names VCI
into computer at combined intel center political order
battle section. Beginning of computerized blacklist. In
Saigon DIA, FBI and CIA used computers. Until 70
computerized blacklist a unilateral American op. Valentine,
D. (1990). The Phoenix Program, 259.